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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**

ELIGIBILITY FOR CHAPTER 13 AS
A REQUIREMENT FOR DISMISSAL
OF CHAPTER 7 CASE BASED ON
"SU~STANTIAL ABUSE": IN RE

MASTRO ENI

In an attempt to avoid misuse of
the bankruptcy laws by consumer
debtors, Congress added to the
Bankruptcy Code another ground
for dismissal applicable in liquidation cases commenced on or after
October 8, 1984. 1 The court, on its
own motion "and not at the request or suggestion of any party in
interest," and after notice and a
hearing, may dismiss the case if it
finds that the granting of relief
''would be a substantial abuse'' of
the provisions of chapter 7. This
new ground applies only if the
debtor is an individual whose
liabilities are primarily consumer debts. The amendment also
makes it clear that the debtor is
aided by a presumption in favor of
* Counsel to the law finn of Levin &
Weintraub & Crames, New York City;
member of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
** Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra
University School of Law, Hempstead,
New York; associate member of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
1
See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b), added by the
Bankruptcy Amend,ments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, § 312.
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granting the relief requested by
the debtor.
There is no doubt that this
ground will result in litigation requiring an interpretation of "substantial abuse.'' For example, is it
a substantial abuse of chapter 7
for an insolvent consumer to file a
petition if future income would be
sufficient to fund a chapter 13 plan
paying creditors a greater percentage of their claims? A comparison of statements -made by
legislators renders the answer to
this question unclear. Representative Peter Rodino chairman of the
Judiciary Committee of the House
of Representatives, stated that
the 1984 amendments "contain
no threshold or future income
tests. " 2 However, Representative
Anderson indicated that it is a
"substantial abuse" of chapter 7
if "the debtor is found capable of
fulfilling the terms of a chapter 13
repayment agreement.' ' 3 In one of
the first decisions on this issue,
the court in In re Edwards 4 inter2

130 Cong. Rec. H7489 (June 29, 1984).
130 Cong. Rec. H7499 (June 29, 1984).
4
13Bankr.Ct.Dec.250(S.D.N.Y.1985).
Comparelnre Bryant,47Bankr. 21(D.N.C.
1984) (debtor's concealment of credit card
debts, inflated expenses, and ability to fund
a plan to pay a significant portion of debts
was a substantial abuse of chapter 7). See
3
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preted substantial abuse to mean sonal needs. 6 The debtor earns
that the debtor's future income $73,000 per year as an officer of an
and expenses would permit the international oil trading company.
funding of a chapter 13 plan that His assets, including $9,500 in
would pay 100 percent of the prin- IRA accounts, are worth $14,485.
cipal amount of unsecured claims
The debtor's financial problems
in a three-year period.
resulted from speculative stock
market trading and the loss of
his former job in 1983. Between
In Re Mastroeni
1979 and 1985, he paid an average
$17,000 per year in interest
of
A recent decision by the bankto
bank
creditors. He promptly
5
ruptcy court in In re Mastroeni
spent
a
$10,000
tax refund within
could, if followed, have a limiting
months
before
filing
the chapter 7
effect on the application of Sec1985,
using the
petition
in
July
tion 707(b) in consumer cases infunds
for
automobile
repairs,
furvolving sizable indebtedness. Durniture,
air
conditioners,
and
other
ing a hearing on a request for relief from the automatic stay ini- personal needs.
The debtor's schedule of curtiated by a bank asserting the right
to set off ,the debtor's obligation rent income and expenditures reagainst several individual retire- flected a net monthly take-home
ment accbunts (IRAs), certain pay of $4,000 and monthly exfacts cam~ to the judge's attention penses of $3,980.
causing the court on its own motion to issue a notice to the debtor
Evidence of Abuse
to show cause why his liquidation
The court focused on several
petition should not be dismissed
factors
that are usually relevant in
pursuant to Section 707(b) and the
determining
whether a petition is
"substantial abuse" of chapter 7.
a
substantial
abuse of chapter 7.
The debtor's schedules reflect
First;
the
court
noted that the
$110,850 in unsecured debts,
debtor's
$73,000
salary
rendered
which arose from loans from six
him
financially
capable
of
partially
banks to finance stock market
repaying
his
consumer
creditors
trading and for the debtor's perover a period of years. "Indeed,

also In re Grant, 13 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 303
(N.D. Ohio 1985) (petition dismissed where
debtor could fund a chapter 13 plan paying
68 percent of debts over five years instead of
only 2 percent distribution in liquidation).
5 13 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1129 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
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6 Although the court's reasoning and
decision are sound, it is questionable
whether the loans constituted consumer
debts within the definition of § 10 1(7):
" 'Consumer debt' means debt incurred
by an individual primarily for a personal,
family, or household purpose.''
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he managed to repay approximately $90,000 over approximately five years until reaching a
point where he felt that he was
emotionally drained by the debt
burden and he decided to seek
financial relief and the potential
fresh start afforded under Chapter
7 of the Bankruptcy Code.' ' 7
Second, the debtor's monthly
estimated expenses as stated in
his schedule "are obviously inflated. "8 His estimated monthly
electric bill of $150 for a threeroom apartment "does not appear
to be realistic. " 9 Food and household supplies of $600 and recreation expenses of $700 per month
for one person "do not appear to
be in line." 10 The court referred
to In re Bryant, 11 where the bankruptcy court mentioned inflated
expenses as a reason for dismiss~l
under Section 707(b). As stated m
Bryant, "While Congress i~ten~
ed to give the debtors rehef m
such cases, it was not the design
of the Bankruptcy laws to allow
the Debtor to lead the life of Riley
while his creditors suffer on his
behalf."12 Relevant to this factor,
the court emphasized that the
debtor disposed of a $10,000 income tax refund shortly before
bankruptcy by paying $1,700 to
repair his 1981 Audi automobile
'13 Bankr. Ct. Dec. at 1130-1131.
/d. at 1131.

1

and by spending the remainder to
acquire furniture and other items
for his apartment and personal
needs.
Ineligible for Chapter 13

Regardless of the debtor's high
income, ability to pay at least a
significant portion of his debts
over time, and inflated expenses,
the court would not dismiss the
chapter 7 petition under Section
707(b) because the debtor's unsecured debts exceeded $100,000,
which rendered him ineligible for
chapter 13 relief. 13
The court reasoned that a partial repayment of consumer obligations is feasible ·only under a
chapter 13 plan. Section 1306(a)(2)
provides that property of the estate includes postpetition earnings
of a chapter 13 debtor. In contrast, postpetition earnings from
services performed by an individual debtor in either chapter 7 or
chapter 11 are not included in the
estate pursuant to Section 541
(a)(6). Thus, postpetition salary is
"not required to be available for
repayment purposes under either
Chapter 7 or Chapter 11." 14 The
court pointed out that chapter 11
would not be an acceptable alternative to relief under chapter 7.
''An individual consumer debtor
with minimal assets could not
be compelled to consummate a

9Jd.
10 /d.
11

47 Bankr. 21 (D.N.C. 1984).

12

Jd. at 26; see also In re Grant, 51

n See II U.S.C. § 109(e); see also In re
White, 49 Bankr. 869 (W.D.N.C. 1985).
1• 13 Bankr. Ct. Dec. at 1130.

Bankr. 385 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
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Chapter 11 plan because the debtor's postpetition income may not
be treated as property of the estate . . . and as such the debtor
cannot be compelled to fund a
Chapter 11 plan with such income. Therefore, an individual
consumer's Chapter 11 plan
would not much differ from a
Chapter 7 liquidation." ts
In reaching its conclusion, the
court was careful to note that the
availability of chapter 13 relief
does not necessarily
mean that
I
consumer debtors must forego
chapter 7. The court points out
several sections of the Code that
reflect Congress's intention to
allow chapter 7 relief despite the
availability of chapter 13. Under
Section 706(c), the court may not
order conversion of a chapter 7
case to a chapter 13 case unless it
is requested by the debtor. The
1984 amendments to the Code
stopped short ·of requiring consumer debtors with prospects for
substantial future income to make
some effort to repay creditors
under chapter 13. Section 707(b)
contains an express presumption
in favor of granting chapter 7 relief when the debtor requests it.
Moreover, only the court may
raise the issue as to the appropri•s Id. at 1131. Contra In re Bell, 56
Bankr. 637, 642 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986)
(''Although the debtor is not eligible to file
a Chapter 13 petition because his unsecured debt exceeds $100,000, 11 U.S.C.
§ 109( e) . . . he is nevertheless eligible
to file a Chapter 11 petition 11 U.S.C.
§ 109(d). ").
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ateness of chapter 7-others have
no standing to do so. Finally, the
court may find that "an honest
debtor's economic picture may
not support a continuing obligation to repay partially or fully all
of the prepetition creditors without jeopardizing the fresh start
contemplated by the discharge
available under 11 U.S.C. § 727
(a)., t6

Although it was not necessary
for the court to hypothesize or decide whether Mastroeni's chapter
7 petition would have been dismissed if his unsecured debts did
not exceed $100,000, the court did
arrive at a sound resolution in
emphasizing the hardship to the
debtor of a dismissal:
A dismissal of a Chapter 7 consumer debtor's petition pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. § 707(b), when the
debtor is ineligible for Chapter 13
relief and where Chapter 11 is not a
meaningful alternative, would not
be consistent with the legislative
intent to encourage repayment in
those instances where a debtor has
sufficient income to repay cre<titors
fully or partially. Indeed, a dismissal in such circumstances would
be tantamount to a denial of a
discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727,
without establishing any of the
statutory grounds for barring such
discharge. 17

The court concluded with a critical attack on the drafters of Section 707(b), who "failed to take
into account the fact that if re16

17

13 Bankr. at 1131.
Id.
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payment is the desired goal under
this section there should be no
limitations placed on the eligibility
of debtors for relief under Chapter
13." 18 The court's commerit that
this oversight, as well as the omission of specific standards to be
used in determining what consti18

Id. at 1131-U32.

tutes a substantial abuse, "highlights the inherent weakness in the
efficacy of the statute." 19
19 Id. at 1132; see Breiturtz, "New Developments in Consumer Bankruptcies:
Chapter 7 Dismissal on the Basis of 'Substantial Abuse,' " (pts. I & 2) 59 Am.
Bankr. L.J. 327 (1985), 60 Am. Bankr. L.J.
33 (1986).

71

